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NOTES
PROTECTION OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S STATUTORY SHARE
AGAINST INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS BY THE DECEDENT*
SUBSTITUTION of the statutory share for dower,' to afford a surviving
spouse some economic security, 2 raises questions concerning the validity of
inter vivos transfers by the decedent in an attempt to defeat the other spouse's
share. Unlike incohate dower,2 the statutory share places no limitations on
inter vivos transfers, but gives to each spouse a share in the estate of the other
at death which cannot be destroyed by testamentary disposition. 4 The interest
which one spouse has in the other's estate is an expectant interest and is
wholly contingent on the decedent's leaving an estate.5 One spouse can, there-
fore, deprive the other of his or her statutory share by absolutely disposing of
his property before death;G but the unwillingness of an individual to render
himself destitute is thought sufficient to prevent this. A difficult problem is
presented, however, when a married person attempts to divest himself of his
property in such a way as to deprive the spouse of a share in his estate and
yet in fact retains the control of it during his lifetime.7
No satisfactoy criterion has been developed by the courts to determine
whether an inter vivos transfer, effective between the transferor and the trans-
* Inda v. Inda, 288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. (2d) 59 (1942).
1. The statutory share has been adopted in thirty-one states and in the District of
Columbia and Hawaii. For a catalogue by states of the statutory provisions, see 3 VER-
NIER, AMERICAN FAmILY LAWS (1935) §§ 188, 189. In New York dower was abolished
after August 31, 1930, by the Real Property Law. See N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 190.
All distinction between real and personal property as to inheritance was also abolished
and the surviving spouse was given a distributive share in the estate of the deceased,
See N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, §§ 18, 83. For a discussion of the advantages of the statu-
tory share as opposed to dower, see Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 884, 886.
2. See N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 20. See also Original Report of the Commission
to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates, New York Leg. Doc. No. 70 (1928) 83;
(1941) 10 BROOKLYN L. REv. 424.
3. See Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 515, 62 Atl. 507, 510 (1905) ; Poole v. Poole,
129 Md. 387, 390, 99 Atl. 551, 553 (1916). See also Original Report of the Commission
to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates, supra note 2; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW (1935) 349. For a discussion of the restrictions imposed by dower on the
alienability of land, see WALSH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1927) 185; (1938) 12 Sr.
JoHN's L. REv. 355.
4. See Matter of Byrnes, 260 N. Y. 465, 184 N. E. 56 (1933); In re Blumen-
stiel's Will, 248 App. Div. 533, 290 N. Y. Supp. 935 (4th Dep't 1936) ; In re Bommer's
Estate, 159 Misc. 511, 288 N. Y. Supp. 419 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
5. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 376, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 967 (1937).
6. See Krause v. Krause, 285 N. Y. 27, 32 N. E. (2d) 779 (1941) ; Marine Midland
Trust Co. of Binghamton v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 648 (3d Dep't
1939), aff'd, 281 N. Y. 760, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1939).
7. In such cases the transfers are usually made without consideration. See Note
(1937) 46 YALE L. J. 884.
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feree,s should be set aside as in derogation of the surviving spouse's statutory
share.9 Some courts hold that subjective intent to defeat the interest of the
surviving spouse is sufficient to nullify it.10 By the test adopted in New York
and in the majority of jurisdictions, however, the validity of a transfer is
determined by whether it is real or illusory; by whether the decedent in goudl
faith divested himself of the ownership of the property." But the nature of
the test is not clear. Although the New York Court of Appeals has talked
confusingly in terms of intent, saying that the good faith required refers to the
intent to divest oneself of ownership,' 2 this language appears to have been
used to emphasize that intent to deprive the surviving spouse of his statutory
share is immaterial.' 3 Other discussion indicates that the onl" intent involved
is that manifested by the acts of the decedent, that is, objective rather than
subjective intent.' 4 The test would thus seem to be whether the decedent did
in fact divest himself of ownership. Once it is established either that owner-
ship was or was not relinquished, objective intent can be found in the assump-
tion that a person must intend the natural consequences of his acts. Yet no
rule is presented by which to determine what transfers are real and what illu-
sory, for the court has refused to say how far a spouse must divest himself
8. No problem arises when the transfer is invalid as between the transfer,.r and the
transferee, for the property remains part of the estate at death.
9. For a discussion of the devices used and the reaction of the courts to them, see
Note (1937) 46 YA. L. J. 884.
10. See Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2 (1930) ; Dyer v. Smith, 62
Mo. App. 606 (1895) ; Crecelius v. Horst, 4 Mo. App. 419 (1877); Evans v. Evans, 78
N. H. 352, 100 Atl. 671 (1917); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 At. 153 (15S9) ;
Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842). See Calm. Restraints on Disinheritance (1936)
85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139, 150. For a criticism of the intent rule, see Newman v. Dore,
275 N. Y. 371, 376, 379, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 967, 969 (1937); (1938) S LT. or Cm. L
REv. 504.
11. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937) ; Small v. Small,
56 Kan. 1, 42 Pac. 323 (1895) ; Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 106 (1902) ;
Wright v. Holmes, 100 'Me. 508, 62 At. 507 (1905) ; Patter Title & Trust Co. v. Braum,
294 Pa. 482, 144 Atl. 401 (1928).
12. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 379, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 969 (1937).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. The court described the real-illusory test as that applied in Leonard v.
Leonard, 181 'Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902). In that case and the cases cited there
intention was mentioned, if at all, only to emphasize its irrelevance. Mureover, the court
in the Neawman case, professed to apply the test as it is formulated in most jurisdictions.
And in most jurisdictions, where the test is applied, intention has no part in it. See
Williams v. Williams, 40 Fed. 521 (C. C. Kan. 18S9) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 30 Colo. 516,
71 Pac. 363 (1903) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 5 Conn. *317 (1824) ; Poole v. Poole, 96 Kan.
84, 150 Pac. 592 (1915); Small v. Small, 56 Kan. 1, 42 Pac. 323 (IS95); Rabbitt v.
Gaither, 67 Md. 94, 8 AtI. 744 (1887); Jones v. Somerville, 78 'Miss. 269, 28 So. 940
(1900) ; Farrell -. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159, 74 Pac. 96 (1903) ; Lines V. Lines, 142 Pa. 149,
21 Atl. 809 (1891). But see Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Ad. 213 (1903). Further-
more, the language used by the Court of Appeals indicates that the acts of the decedent
are alone important and that the intention referred to is merely that shown by them. See
Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 381, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 969 (1937).
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of his interest in his property to render a transfer more than illusory.16 The
holdings in the Newman 10 and Krause 17 cases signify, however, that a trans-
fer will be deemed illusory if the decedent retains power to revoke it and
controls the property and receives the income from it, while a transfer will
be called real if it is irrevocable even though control and income are reserved.
From these propositions no conclusion can be drawn as to whether a power
of revocation would alone be sufficient to render a transfer illusory.' 8
A recent case adds new confusion.' 9 Albert Inda was married in 1890 and
died intestate in 1940, leaving his wife, Anne, and ten children. In 1935 he
opened two savings bank accounts: one in the names of "Wojciech Panowic-
or Victoria J. Inda-Joint Account either or survivor may draw"; and the
other, in the names of "Wojciech Panowicz or Andrew P. Inda-pay to either
or survivor of them." Wojciech Panowicz was a fictitious name given the
banks by Albert Inda. The decedent's wife brought an action to recover the
monies in these accounts on the theory that the deposits were illusory trans-
fers and therefore ineffective to deprive her of her expectancy as widow tinder
the Decedent Estate Law. It was found by the trial court that the transfers
were in fact illusory since Albert Inda always treated the accounts as his own
sole property and never intended to nor did divest himself of the complete
ownership of the funds in them. The New York Court of Appeals concluded,
however, that this finding was immaterial 20 and that tinder the Banking
Law 21 the existence of a joint tenancy was conclusively presumed by the
form of the deposits.22 Without discussion it then assumed that the creation
of such a tenancy constituted a real transfer and could not be set aside.
At first sight it would appear that because of the Banking Law an appli-
cation of the real-illusory test necessarily deprived the widow in the instant
case of the interest the Decedent Estate Law intended her to have. The court
was not, however, compelled by the Banking Law to declare absolute a trans-
fer which was in fact illusory. In its interpretation of the Banking Law the
court seems to have followed two previous cases 23 in which it was said that
a deposit in the form prescribed by the statute creates during the joint lives
15. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 381, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 969 (1937).
16. Ibid.
17. Krause v. Krause, 285 N. Y. 27, 32 N. E. (2d) 779 (1941).
18. In Pennsylvania it would not. There a transfer has been held real although the
decedent retained power of revocation, income from the property, and a large measure of
control. Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891).
19. Inda v. Inda, 288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. (2d) 59 (1942), aff'g, 263 App. Div. 925,
32 N. Y. S. (2d) 1008 (4th Dep't 1942), aff'g without opinion, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 1001
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
20. 288 N. Y. at 318, 43 N. E. (2d) at 61.
21. N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 369, §249(3). Similar statutes have been adopted in Cali-
fornia, Michigan, Missouri, and Washington. See (1941) 26 WAsH. UNIv. L. Q, 286;
(1941) 16 WASH. L. REv. 106; (1938) 13 WASH. L. REv. 230; (1926) 54 WASH. L.
REP. 745.
22. 288 N. Y. at 318, 43 N. E. (2d) at 61.
23. See Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 400, 167 N. E. 506, 512 (1929) ; Mar-
row v. Moskowitz, 255 N. Y. 219, 222, 174 N. E. 460 (1931).
[Vol. 52
NOTES
of the parties a presumption of a joint tenancy, rebuttable by proof of a con-
trary intent, and that on the death of either of the parties this presumption
becomes conclusive as to any money remaining in the account. But there
would seem to have been no necessity for extending this statement to the
principal case. The statute does not say that on the death of either party a
conclusive presumption arises that a joint tenancy existed during their joint
lives as to any monies left in the account. It says that, after the death of either,
the making of the deposit in the prescribed form "shall . . . be conclusive evi-
dence . . . of the intention of both depositors to v'est title to such deposit . . .
in [the] survivor." 24 As has been seen, the intention of the decedent in mak-
ing an inter vivos transfer is immaterial. The only relevant question therefore
is whether in fact he divested himself of ownership; and there is nothing in
the statute to prevent a showing that he did not. If, on the other hand, sonic
lack of intention to surrender full ownership is deemed essential for an illu-
sory trafisfer, the statute could be said to establish an intention to vest title
at the time of death rather than at the time of the making of the deposit.
Similarly, if the statute creates a conclusive presumption of a joint tenancy,
it could be said to vest title conclusively in the survivor at death and not at
the time of the deposit.- 5 In either case the illusory character of the transfer
would depend on the respective rights of the depositors during the life of the
decedent, and these rights could be shown under either of these interpreta-
tions of the Banking Law.2 0
Mloreover, even though a joint tenancy existed either in fact or by conclu-
sive presumption, the court could have declared the transfer illusory with re-
spect to half the deposit by following the Nemani and Krause cases. Under
a joint account each person receives a half of the income and can withdraw a
half of the deposits.2 7 Consequently, one who sets up a joint account with his
24. N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 369, § 249(3) (emphasis added).
25. For the argument see latter of Reed, 89 Misc. 632, 154 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Surr.
Ct 1915). The legislature has recognized that title to the funds not deposited by the
survivor does not vest in him until the death of the other tenant. See N. Y. Laws 1929,
c. 383, § 220(5) ; Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 393, 167 N. E. 505, 510 (1929).
But see In re Darashinsky's Estate, 145 'Misc. 426, 260 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
Note (1930) 66 A. L. R. 881.
26. Such an interpretation would not lessen the protection afforded savings banks
by section 249(3) of the Banking Law, since notice to the bank of any adverse claim is
not effective unless a court order is obtained or a suitable bond given. 'Moreover, inter-
pleader of all adverse claims is provided in an action brought to recover the deposit.
See N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 369, § 250(1) and (2). For a discussion of the New York law
on joint bank accounts, see Havens v. Havens, 126 Misc. 155, 213 N. Y. Supp. 230 (Sup.
Ct 1925); (1932) 3 Fm. L. CHroN. 22; (1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 525; (1923) 9 Cora:.
L. Q. 48. For a consideration of joint bank accounts in general, see (1937) 32 IL. L
REv. 57; (1933) 81 Uxrv. oF PA. L. REv. 743; (1930) 19 GEo. L J. 100. For a discussion
of the theories on which they are based, see (1941) 16 W,%sn. L. Rsv. 105. And for the
history of the device, see Katzenstein, Joint Sazings Bank Accounts in Maryland (1939)
3 MD. L. REv. 109.
27. O'Connor v. Dunnigan, 158 App. Div. 334, 143 N. Y. Supp. 373 (3d Dep't 1913),
aff'd, 213 N. Y. 676, 107 N. E. 1082 (1914) ; In re Hoffman's Estate, 175 Misc. C07, 25
N. Y. S. (2d) 339 (Surr. Ct. 1940); In re Sutter's Estate, 138 Misc. 85, 245 N. Y. Supp.
19431
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own funds retains as to one-half of the property control, income, and power
to revoke the transfer. And in the Newmnan and Krause cases retention of
these incidents of ownership was held sufficient to render a transfer illusory.28
If the court had not declared the transfer real in the instant case it would
have been faced with the problem of deciding whether a transfer can be set
aside as illusory in favor of a surviving spouse when the decedent has died
intestate .2  The expressly declared purpose of the Decedent Estate Law is
"to increase the share of a surviving spouse . . . either in a case of intestacy
or by an election against the terms of a will. . .. " 3 When a married person
dies leaving a will, section 18 of the statute permits the surviving spouse to
elect against the will unless it makes certain minimum provision for him. It
does not permit the spouse to challenge any illusory transfers. Such trans-
fers have been set aside by the courts not because of section 18, but because
the purpose of the statute would otherwise have been vitiated.31 But the
636 (Surr. Ct. 1930). See Bowditch v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 247, 190 N. W.
699 (1922) ; Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 190 N. W. 698 (1922). See
also SCHOULER, PERSONAL PROPERTY (5th ed. 1918) 224; (1942) 8 UNIv. OF PIn. L.
REV. 130.
28. The court in the principal case emphasized that section 249(3) of the Banking
Law makes joint bank accounts "a lawful and convenient method for the transmission of
property." 288 N. Y. at 317,43 N.E. (2d) at60. This fact should not, however, deter the
courts from setting them aside as illusory transfers in order to protect the surviving
spouse. Like the trusts in the Newman and Krause cases they may be valid for all other
purposes and yet invalid for this one. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 380, 9 N. E.
(2d) 966, 969 (1937).
29. Consideration of this issue was deemed unnecessary. 288 N. Y. at 318, 43 N. E.
(2d) at 61. Moreover, the discussion of this question which has appeared in the cases
is extremely inadequate. See Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28
N. Y. S. (2d) 841 (2d Dep't 1941) ; Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div.
132, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 915 (1st Dep't 1939); Clavin v. Clavin, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 377
(Sup. Ct. 1943). The court in the instant case might have been forced to render a deci-
sion on this question if an appeal had been taken from the judgment of the trial court as
to a third account set up by Inda in a commercial bank, to which section 249(3) of the
Banking Law does not apply. As to that account, it could have been shown, under the
court's interpretation of the Banking Law, that no joint tenancy existed and that tho
decedent never divested himself of the ownership of the funds. The trial court set aside
the account as an illusory transfer in derogation of the widow's rights. The absence of
a will seems to have been considered immaterial, since no mention was made of it, See
Inda v. Inda, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
30. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 20.
31. The decisions in the Newman and Krause cases were frankly based on the policy
of the statute. Although there was a will in the Neunman case, the widow had no right
of election under section 18, for the will made sufficient provision for her. See N. Y.
Laws 1929, c. 229, § 18(b). The testator, however, transferred all his property before
death and left none for distribution under the will. In order to effectuate the policy of
the statute the court set aside the transfer as illusory and restored the property to the
decedent's estate from whence it went to the widow by the terms of the will.
In the Krause case, the will left all the decedent's property to his three children and
completely disinherited his wife. Although it does not appear from the facts, the prop-
erty transferred by means of a Totten Trust was evidently not included in the will. For if
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policy of the statute is neither embodied in nor limited to those sections deal-
ing with wills.32 If, therefore, the courts are justified in relying upon the
policy of the statute to protect a surviving spouse when there is a will, they
are equally justified in so doing when the decedent has died intestate.0
3
The decision in the present case raises some doubt as to whether the Ncw-
man-Krause test of an illusory transfer will be followed. It leaves undecided
the problem of whether illusory transfers will be invalidated in favor of the
surviving spouse when the decedent has died intestate. Yet it does provide a
definite method by which one spouse can wholly disinherit the other without
divesting himself of the ownership of his property during his lifetime-a re-
sult which, from the standpoint of the legislature's intent, is unfortunate.
it had been, the court need not have called the trust illusory, since the will would have
automatically revoked the Totten Trust and the widow would then have taken by election
against the will. See In re Mannix's Estate, 147 Misc. 479, 264 N. Y. Supp. 24 (Surr.
Ct 1933) ; Matter of Murray, 143 Misc. 499, 256 N. Y. Supp. 815 (Surr. Ct. 1932). The
court could have permitted the widow to have elected against the will and taken her share
from the other legacies. See Matter of Byrnes, 260 N. Y. 465, 184 N. E. E6 (1933). But it
would seem that there was not enough property for distribution under the will to make
this remedy of any avail. The court, therefore, applied the policy of the statute and set
aside the Totten Trust as an illusory transfer. The property then became a part of the
decedent's estate subject to distribution among the three children by the terms of the will.
And the widow could elect against the will and take her share as in intestacy from the
children's legacies.
Another theory on which illusory transfers could be set aside is that they are enough
like testamentary dispositions to warrant the application of the statutory rules governing
testamentary transactions. It would be difficult, however, to elect against a trust or joint
bank account as if it were a will because the statute provides that election must tal:e
place within six months after the issuance of letters testamentary or letters of adminis-
tration with the will annexed. See N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 18(7). This theory has
not been accepted by the courts. See Matter of Schurer, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N. Y. Supp.
28 (Surr. -Ct 1935).
32. The purpose of the legislature to protect the surviving spouse is stated in N. Y.
Laws 1929, c. 229, § 20 and specifically declared to apply both to section 18 and to sec.
tion 83, which defines the intestate share of the surviving spouse and other intestate dis-
tributees.
33. It may be noted that in some cases the surviving spouse's intestate share may ex-
ceed the share he would have taken if the decedent had left a will and he had elected to tazke
against it. See N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, §§ 18(a), 83. This fact, however, constitutes no
reason for setting aside an illusory transfer only when the decedent has died testate.
Section 18 defines the minimum share which the surviving spouse can take when the de-
cedent has died testate. Section 83 defines the share which the surviving spouse shall
take when the decedent has died intestate. X. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 20 declares that the
legislature's intention in granting each of these shares was to enlarge the property rights
of the surviving spouse. If, following that intention, the courts protect one of the shares
granted by the legislature against illusory transfers, they should also protect the other.
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TAXATION OF TRUSTS DISCHARGING THE PARENTAL
OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT*
ALTHOUGH the ability-to-pay principle is one of the few basic tenets of
American taxation which is rarely if ever openly challenged, 1 taxpayers are
apparently untiring in their efforts to evade the statutory expression of that
principle embodied in the imposition of progressive surtaxes. The realloca-
tion of taxable income within the family group, particularly by means of the
family trust,2 is one channel along which much of this attempted tax avoid-
ance has been directed. In recent years, however, the courts have become in-
creasingly sensitive 3 to the demands of the federal treasury and to the
antisocial implications4 of tax discrimination and avoidance, and have shorn
the family trust of much of its former effectiveness.r
The United States Supreme Court has recently furthered this trend in
Helvering v. Stuart 6 by materially extending the doctrine of Douglas v. Will-
cuts 7 that income used to meet the taxpayer's parental obligation to support is
taxable to him and by possibly increasing the indicia of control which will
justify imposition of tax under the Clifford doctrine." In March, 1930, John
* Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
1 But see Field, Should the Ability-to-Pay Principle be Reexantincdf (1942) 20
.TAXEs 664. The author concludes: "Is not the ability to pay principle turning out to be
a collectivist Trojan horse?"
2. Another device of increasing importance is the family partnership. See Hum-
phreys v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Commissioner v. Olds, 60
F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); R. C. Bennett, 1941-42 P. H. BTA Mem. Dec.
I 41,408. From the standpoint of efficient surtax evasion, however, private legal devices
such as the family trust and the family partnership. can not begin to compete with state
community property laws. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930); Oliver, Co,&mu-
nity Property and the Taxation of Family Income (1942) 20 TEx. L. REv. 532; Ray,
Proposed Changes in Federal Taxation of Community Property (1942) 30 CALIF. L.
REv. 397, 527. The adoption of compulsory joint returns would close these 'and other
related loopholes. See Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7378,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 9-10; Comment (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 355, 394 et seq.
3. See Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (1933) ("A contrary decision would make
evasion of the statute a simple matter.") ; Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933). But
see Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (E. D. Pa., 1940), reV'd, 120 F. (2d) 476 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1941) ("This, however, is no warrant for this court to take over the task of
catching up with the taxpayer.").
4. See Holmes, J., dissenting in Campana de Tabocas v. Collector, 275 U. S. 87,
100 (1927) ("Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.").
5. A few of the more famous victories in this campaign are Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U. S. 331 (1940) (irrevocable trusts) ; Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 (1933) (income
from irrevocable trusts used to discharge "a pressing social duty" of the settlor) ; Corliss
v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (1930) (revocable trusts) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930)
(assignment of income). The outstanding defeat is represented by Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U. S. 101 (1930) (community property). See Rudick, The Problem of Personal Income
Tax Avoidance (1940) 1 LAw & COxTEMP. PRoB. 243.
6. 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
7. 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
8. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
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Stuart created separate trusts for each of his three adult children, naming
himself, his wife, and his brother, R. Douglas Stuart, as trustees. Two years
later, R. Douglas Stuart set up separate trusts for each of his four minor chil-
dren, also naming himself, his wife, and his brother as trustees. Under the
provisions of the R. Douglas Stuart trust indentures, each beneficiary was to.
receive one-half of the principal on reaching the age of thirty (twenty-five in
the case of the son) and the remainder five years later. Prior to the termina-
tion of the trusts the trustees were to pay over to the beneficiaries as much of
the annual income as the trustees should deem advisable. The John Stuart
trustees were vested with similar discretionary powers which were to ter-
minate at the end of fifteen years, and thereafter the trustees were to pay the
entire net income from each trust to the beneficiary for life. The corpus of
both the John Stuart and R. Douglas Stuart trusts consisted of shares of the
common stock of the Quaker Oats Company, of which John and R. Douglas
Stuart were president and first vice-president respectively. In both the John
and R. Douglas Stuart trust indentures the respective wife and brother were
specifically empowered, inter alia, "to alter, change, or amend this Indenture
at any time and from time to time by changing the beneficiary hereunder . . .
or in any other respect." In August, 1935, an amendment was executed to
each of the trust indentures canceling these powers and substituting the state-
ment that "this Indenture and all of the provisions thereof are irrevocable and
not subject to alteration, change, or amendment." 9
The Commissioner, relying on sections 166 and 167 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which tax the settlor where either the trust corpus or income may be
revested in him at "the discretion of any person not having a substantial ad-
verse interest," and on section 22(a), taxing "income derived from any
source whatever," sought to tax the net income of each of the John and R.
Douglas Stuart trusts for 1934 and for the period in 1935 prior to the can-
cellation of the trustees' powers to amend. In the case of the R. Douglas Stuart
trusts, the Commissioner also asserted that the obligation to support the set-
flor's minor children during the taxable years in question and the discretionary
power of the trustees, which might discharge this obligation, to distribute the
net income to each child-beneficiary, brought the income from those trusts
within the Douglas v. Wfillcuts doctrine.
The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the Commissioner as against both
settlor-taxpayers, holding that under Illinois law the trustees would not be
acting outside of the powers granted them in the trust indentures if they re-
vested corpus or income in the grantors and that therefore the settlors were
liable for tax under sections 166 and 167.10 No decision was made as to lia-
bility under section 22(a). The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the Board's findings as to Illinois law and held both the set-
tlor-taxpayers not taxable under any of the sections invoked by the Com-
missioner." Similarly, the court refused to apply the doctrine of Douglas v.
9. No attempt was made to tax to the settlor trust incume accruing subsequently to
this amendment.
10. 42 B. T. A. 1421 (1940).
11. 124 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
1943]
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Willcuts to funds which although available for the support of the grantor's
minor children were not actually used for that purpose. 12 The Supreme Court
accepted the circuit court's conclusions as to sections 166 and 167,13 but re-
manded the John Stuart case to the Tax Court for a finding as to whether
-or not the settlor had retained such attributes of ownership as would bring
him within the Clifford interpretation of section 22(a). 14 R. Douglas Stuart,
however, was held taxable on the entire net income of all the trusts of which
he was the settlor on the ground that mere availability, as opposed to actual
use, of the entire income of the trusts for the support of the settlor's minor
children was sufficient to bring this income within Douglas v. Willcuts.15 In
thus extending Douglas v. Willcuts to the factual situation presented by the
R. Douglas Stuart trusts, the Supreme Court has taken a position contrary
to that previously adopted by the Treasury Department 10 and one which the
lower courts, 17 and at least one commentator,' had once thought untenable.
But since the statute states that the grantor is liable for tax "where any part
of the income of a trust may . . . be distributed" to the grantor,10 and since
Douglas v. Willcuts declared that trust income used to relieve a grantor's legal
12. Id. at 780.
13. 317 U. S. 154, 163 (1942).
14. Id. at 169.
15. Id. at 171.
16. G. C. M. 18972, 1937-2 Cum. Bull. 231, 233. "This office has reached the conclu-
sion that in cases where the trust income, or at least part of it, might, in the discretion
of the trustees, have been used to support the minor children of the grantor there should
be taxed to the grantor only so much of the trust income as is actually distributed for
the support and maintenance of the beneficiaries whom the grantor is legally obligated
to support." But see U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, art. 167-1(b). "The income so inures if it
is or may be applied in satisfaction of a legal obligation of the grantor ... " (Italics
supplied).
17. Hudson v. Jones, 22 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Okla., 1938); Deuble v. Commis-
sioner, 42 B. T. A. 277 (1940); Chandler v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 165 (1940);
Berolzheimer v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 645 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 116 F.
(2d) 628 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Tiernan v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 1048 (1938) ; Black
v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 346 (1937). Contra: Whiteley v. Commissioner, 120 F.
(2d) 782 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) ; Pyeatt v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 774 (1939). In the
Pyeatt case the discretion to disburse trust income for the support of the grantor's stir-
viving child was vested in the grantor, rather than the trustee, and thus was distinguish-
able from the Stuart case on its facts. In the Whliteley case the court discussed but made
no decision as to the possibility of correlating section 167 and Douglas v. lVillcuts. The
court relied instead on Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940), and "the non-material
satisfaction" which the accumulation of trust income for the benefit of the settlor's son
gave the settlor. The Supreme Court in the Stuart case, however, stated that the mere
fact that this "would satisfy the normal desires of a parent to make gifts to his clil-
dren" was not "sufficient to make the income of the trust taxable to the settlors." 317
U. S. 154, 168. The Supreme Court also cited the Horst case for the proposition that
"the 'non-material satisfactions' (gifts-contributions) of a donor are not taxable as In-
come." Ibid.
18. See Paul, Five Years With Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 HAI1y. L. REv. 1,
7, n. 18. See also MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 245, 246.
19. INT. Ray. CODE § 167 (1939). (Italics supplied).
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obligation is income distributed to the grantor, -° ° it would seem that on this
point the Stuart decision merely represents a logical correlation of section 167
with the doctrine of constructive receipt.2 1
The logical impregnability of the Stuart extension will not, however, pre-
clude taxpayers' attacking it, and it is more than probable that an effort will
be made to induce the courts to limit the Stuart extension to such income as
would reasonably be required, though not actually used, to meet the parental
obligation of support.22 The argument might be made that the Stuart rationale
can hardly require that a settlor be liable for tax, for example, on the entire
income of a million-dollar trust for the benefit of a two-year-old infant. 3
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did hold the entire net income from
all four of the R. Douglas Stuart trusts for the year 1934, each of which
amounted to over $9,000, taxable to the settlor, although the beneficiaries
were eighteen, fourteen, twelve, and six years old. 'Moreover, if the courts
attempted to set arithmetical limits to the parental obligation and if they
adhered to the accepted proposition that the parental obligation varies with
the parent's wealth, station in life, and age of the children,24 they would open
the door to interminable litigation.
20. See Paul, supra note 18.
21. The limits to this correlation are not easily defined. The fact that Douglas v'.
Willcuts was not applied in the case of the John Stuart trusts suggests that trust income
available for the support of children over 21 years of age will not be income to the par-
ent-settlor. See 317 U. S. at 163. It is also probable that the income from a trust set
up by a third person for the support of a minor child will not be taxable to the parent on
the theory that such income is a gratuitous discharge of the latter's parental obligation.
See Paul, supra note 18, at 31. But it might be argued that such a transfer is a gift to the
father, not of the capital fund itself, but of annually recurring inco me paid to the bene-
ficiary in discharge of the father's obligation and that, therefore, the father is taxable
under Irwin v. Gavit, 288 U. S. 161 (1925). See Note (1935) 48 Htnv. L. RPv. 815, 818.
The Supreme Court was careful to point out that it wvas "not here appraising the
application of § 167 to cases where a wife is the trustee or beneficiary of the funds which
may be used for the family benefit." 317 U. S. at 170. A subsequent decision of the Tax
Court has held the Stuart extension not applicable to that situation. Walter L and V. C.
Ferris, 1 T. C. 992 (1943).
22. There is precedent for distinguishing between trust income used to pay for a
minor beneficiary's necessities and that used for his luxuries. See Ryburn G. Clay, 36
B. T. A. 1326 (1937).
23. This is Mr. Paul's example of Douglas -,. Willcuts reductio ad absurdum. "Yet
surely there must be some limit to the principle of the Douglas case in this connection;
if we may imagine a million-dollar trust for the benefit of a two-year-old child, it would
be wholly arbitrary and fancible to hold the entire income taxable to the father on the
theory of support." See Paul, supra note 18, at 30.
24. In Cromwell v. Converse, 108 Conn. 412, 426, 143 A. 416, 421 (1928), the court
said "Maintenance and support . . . are not words of art, but have a relative mean-
ing . . . . The testator possessed large means; his children had been reared in luxurious
living and were accustomed to its uses. What was suitable fur his son's situation and
station in life is that which those possessed of great wealth and social position customarily
adopt for their scale of living in these modern times." See also Park Utah Consol. Mines
v. Industrial Commissioner, 84 Utah 481, 36 P. (2d) 979 (1934) ; Lake v. Bender, 18 Nev.
361, 7 Pac. 74 (1885).
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In addition to the difficulties which may arise from any attempt to set arith-
metical limits upon the parental obligation of support, the Stuart extension
of Douglas v. Willcuts confronts the Treasury Department with several
administrative problems. These problems are largely the result of a General
Counsel's Memorandum, issued by the Treasury Department in 1937, stating
that settlors were taxable on only so much of the trust income as was actually
used to relieve the settlor of his parental obligation of support. 2r Taxpayers
who, after 1937, set up trusts similar to those involved in the R. Douglas
Stuart case may argue that they acted in reliance upon the Treasury De-
partment's G.C.M. and to tax them now would be grossly inequitable.20
Specifically, the problem is whether or not the Treasury Department, within
the confines of a right to tax retroactively for three years,2 7 should attempt
to tax (1) the income accruing prior to the Stuart decision from trusts created
before the issuance of the G.C.M., (2) the income accruing prior to the Stuart
decision from trusts created after the issuance of the G.C.M., (3) the income
accruing subsequent to the Stuart decision from trusts created before the
issuance of the G.C.M., (4) and the income accruing subsequent to the Stuart
25. See G.C.M. 18972, supra note 16.
26. The underlying equities are those created whenever a decision overruling a pre-
vious precedent upon which individuals have relied in acquiring property interests is
given retroactive effect in accordance with the declaratory theory of stare decisis. See
I MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1942) 99; Kocourek, Retrospective Deeisions and
Stare Decisis and A Proposal (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 180. The Federal Constitution
neither precludes nor compels the retroactive application of an overruling case. Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932). Compare
the retroactive effect which a New York court in People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, 242
App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y. Supp. 582 (3d Dep't 1934) gave to the Supreme Court's
overruling of Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928) (state cannot tax income from
copyrights) in Fox Film Corp v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932) (state can tax income from
copyrights), with the prospective effect which the Montana court gave to an overrul-
ing decision in Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont. 216, 7 P.
(2d) 927 (1932). ARNOLD AND JAMES, CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS
(1930) 209, n. 41 characterizes the Montana decision as "probably both unique and emi-
nently sensible."
That a particular decision would cause hardship if retroactive is apparently a good
reason in the opinion of the Supreme Court for not making it. In Helvering v. Griffiths,
63 Sup. Ct. 636, 653 (U. S. 1943), Mr. Justice Jackson said: "To rip out of the past seven
years of tax administration a principle of law on which both Government and taxpayers
have acted would produce readjustments and litigation so extensive we would contem-
plate them with anxiety. We have recently held as to another questioned decision of this
Court that a long period of accommodations to ati older decision sometimes requires us
to adhere to an unsatisfactory rule to avoid unfortunate practical results from a change."
The solution to the problem which is suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent
in the Griffiths case is that "inequities may result from a holding in 1943 that Eisner v.
Macomber has not been law since 1936. But the relief against them lies with Congress.
Our task ends if we erase Eisner v. Macomber and give Congress a clean slate on which
to write." Id. at 655. Relief may also be given by the administrative agency concerned,
See note 29 infra.
27. Section 275 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code limits the Treasury's right to col-
lect taxes to income not previously assessed within the past three years.
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decision from trusts created after the issuance of the G.C.M. Although the
Treasury Department is not legally estopped from seeking to tax those claim-
ing reliance upon a G.C.M%., 2 forbearance to tax income on such trusts which
accrued prior to the Stuart case would seem to be appropriate to avoid the
financial hardship which would be imposed on individuals who might now be
without means to meet a tax which they had been led to believe would not be
levied.2 9 Similar equities arising out of the failure to provide for future tax
liability in reliance upon the 1937 G.C.M. can be marshalled to excuse tax
liability on income accrued prior to the Stuart case from trusts created even
before the G.C.M. No such argument can be advanced, however, to excuse
liability on income accruing after the Stuart decision from trusts established
either before or after the issuance of the G.C.M., although some relief will
probably be sought in the case of the latter on the ground that the trusts were
presumably set up in reliance upon the G.C.M. But such a memorandum
should not operate as a bar to the collection of taxes which the Court has
declared to be properly levied. The evasion of surtaxes should not be a game
in which the taxpayer can never lose. However, much continuing hardship
would be avoided if it were to become judicially established under local law
that a court of equity yill, if applied to by the grantor, expunge those clauses
which authorize the use of trust income to discharge the parental obligation
of support and thus remove the possibility of his being taxed on future trust
income.30 Although the general doctrine is that "if the settlor does not by the
28. On the title page of every Internal Revenue Bulletin the following statement
is printed: "The rulings reported in the Internal Revenue Bulletin are for the informa-
tion of taxpayers and their counsel as showing the trend of official opiniun in the admin-
istration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; the rulings other than Treasury Decisions
have none of the force or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Depart-
ment to any interpretation of the law which has not been formally approved and promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Treasury."
29. The appropriate administrative relief would be similar to that given by the
Treasury Department when confronted by the Hallock decision. In Helvering V. Hal-
lock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), which involved the applicability of the estate tax to trusts
of which the settlor reserved a reversionary interest terminable at the settlor's death,
the Supreme Court specifically overruled Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 29 U. S.
48 (1935) and Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935), which held
that the settlor was not taxable, and reinstated the earlier Klein v. United States, 283
U. S. 231 (1941), which held the settlor was taxable. The Treasury Department then
announced that it would not tax settlors of trusts created in reliance on the St. Lauds
Trust decisions. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17. It is true, of course, that the Halluc:
decision pertains to the taxation of the transfer of trust property, while the Stuart ex-
tension is concerned with the taxation of annually recurring trust income, but the oluit-
able considerations underlying the appropriateness of administrative relief are the same
in both situations. See note 26 supra. An example of legislative relief under similar cir-
cumstances is the recent Congressional amendment to the gift tax law which permits
gift-tax-free releases of existing powers of appointment in order that dnees of the r .wer
may avoid the broadened incidence of the estate tax imposed on the transfer by death of
property via powers of appointment. See Eisenstein, Powers of Appointmen a,:d Estate
Taxes: II (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 494, 545 et seq.
30. A settlor would be, of course, even more effectively insulated against future tax
liability if an amendment to the trust indenture were executed which specifically stated
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terms of the trust reserve a power to alter or amend or modify it, he has no
power to do so," 31 a court of equity might find within its prerogatives the
power and willingness to amend the trust, especially if the amendment re-
quested would increase, or at least not impair, the equitable interest of the
beneficiaries. The conceptual difficulties which might be presented by local
law adverse to such alteration would be minimized if the beneficiary and the
trustee were to join the grantor in applying for this type of amendment
8 2
In addition to correlating section 167 with Douglas v. Willcuts, and thus
further disabling the family trust device, the Supreme Court in the Stuart deci-
sion also opened the way for a substantial extension of the Clifford doctrine.88
After accepting the circuit court's determination that under Illinois law the
settlor had no power to revoke and hence was not liable under sections 166
and 167, the Supreme Court remanded the John Stuart case to the Tax Court
for a finding as to liability under section 22(a).34 The factors recommended
for the Tax Court's consideration materially enlarge the circumstances under
which some courts 35 had previously thought the Clifford doctrine to be appli-
cable. Mr. Justice Reed mentioned specifically as factors to be considered
the possibility that "control of the stocks of the company of which the grantors
were executives may have determined the manner of creating the trusts," the
fact that "paragraph eight [of the trust indenture] permits recapture of the
stocks from the trust by payment of their value," and "the family relationship
[which] evidently played a part in the selection of the trustees." 80 In effect,
the Supreme Court asked the Tax Court to determine whether or not the
settlor "has rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any sub-
stantial change in his economic position" 37 because of the nature of the cor-
pus, the right to recapture, the identity of the trustees, and the control which
the existence of reciprocal trusts gives each grantor over the trustees of his
trust.
that no part of the trust income was to be used for the education, maintenance, or sup-
port of the settlor's minor children.
31. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 331. But see Curtis v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201, 230 (1862)
2 ScoTr, TRUsTs (1939) § 167.
32. See 3 Sco-r, TRUSTS (1939) § 337.
33. For a comprehensive analysis of the Clifford doctrine, see Pavenstedt, The Broad-
ened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 YALE:
L. J. 213.
34. 317 U. S. 154, 169 (1942).
35. The Circuit Court of Appeals. Seventh Circuit, said in holding the Clifford doc-
trine not applicable to the Stuart trusts: "We think the ruling in the Clifford case did
not go so far as to hold that mere family solidarity gave the federal courts the right to
ignore the State jurisdiction to determine the rights of beneficiaries under a trust, and
the extent of the trustees' discretion. The elements required to bring a taxpayer within
the scope of that case are quite clearly noticed in Helvering v. Elias, 2 Cir., 122 F. (2d)
171. They are (a) close family relationship, (b) short term trust, and (c) reservation
of powers of management. See also Commissioners v. Barbour, 2 Cir., 122 F. (2d) 165.
Certiorari was denied in both of these cases, 62 S. Ct. 361. In the present case we have
no short terms, nor power of management in the grantor." 124 F. (2d) at 778.
36. 317 U. S. 154, 169 (1942).
37. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 335 (1940).
[Vol, 52
NOTES
The Stuart case reaffirms the Court's earlier position that the Clifford doc-
trine calls for a realistic appraisal of "all the circumstances attendant on [the]
operation and creation" 38 of the particular trust in question. On the facts
presented, a holding by the Tax Court to the effect that the degree of the set-
tlor's actual, as opposed to formal, control was such as would bring the trust
within the Clifford doctrine could hardly be considered unreasonable, and
such a holding is indicated in the tenor of the Supreme Court's recommenda-
tion.
In remanding the John Stuart case to the Tax Court because "the triers of
fact [had] made no finding on this point," a3 the Supreme Court has appar-
ently modified its earlier disposition to regard liability under the Clifford
doctrine more as an issue of law than of fact.4 0 The restriction thus imposed
on the Court's willingness to review is an outgrowth of the present Court's
tendency, when faced with an administrative determination, to decide whether
a particular issue is one of law or fact on the basis of relative expertness.41
If the Court believes that the issue is one peculiarly within its special com-
petence, or if the issue is one upon which it is particularly anxious to speak,42
then the issue is one of law; if not, then it is one of fact.43 As a result of char-
acterizing liability, under the Clifford doctrine as an issue of fact, in future cases
the Tax Court will probably make a "finding of fact" as to the taxpayer's lia-
bility under each of the theories on which the Treasury is proceeding. And
the number of Tax Court decisions from which an appeal will be taken or cer-
tiorari granted will probably diminish, since "findings of fact" are not rever-
sible on appeal except on a showing of unreasonableness.
44
38. Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
39. 317 U. S. 154, 169 (1942) (Emphasis supplied).
40. In the Clifford case itself, 'Mr. Justice Douglas said: "In this case we cannot
conclude as a matter of law' that respondent ceased to be the owner of the corpus after
the trust was created." (Emphasis supplied). 309 U. S. at 335. See also Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
41. See the concurring opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter in Driscoll v. Edison Light
& Power Co., 307 U. S. 104, 122 (1939) ; concurring opinion of Justices Black, Douglas,
and furphy in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipe Line Co., 315 U. S. 575, 599 (1942) ; Gray v.
Powell, 314 U. S. 402 (1941); LANDIS, THE AtmusmATivE Pnocass (1938) c. IV;
Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Reveme (1943) 56 HARv. L. REv. 899; Hamilton and
Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court (1941) 50 YALE L J. 1319.
42. Individual Justices have not been consistent in their characterizations of admin-
istrative adjudications in the past. For example, contrast the stand of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the Driscoll case, 307 U. S. 104, 122 (1941) (the determination of utility
rates is not within the special competence of the Supreme Court), and his stand in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941) (the ordering of back pay to employees
who had willfully failed to work elsewhere is not within the special competence of the
NLRB). Contrast also Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion in United States v. Carolina
Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475 (1942), with his concurrence in Mr. Justice Mur-
phy's dissent in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra.
43. See Brown, supra note 41.
44. The judicial review which may result from this characterization may be similar
to that outlined in Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 411 (1941). 'Mr. Justice Reed, who
wrote the majority opinion in the Stuart case, said: ". . . the function of review placed
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In the Stuart case the Court also laid down another principle of review
which has less fortunate implications, for the Court has apparently replaced
the former presumption in favor of the Commissioner's determination of local
law 45 with a similar presumption in favor of the circuit court.4 0 The Com-
missioner's original argument had been that there was no express provision in
the trust indentures to prevent the trustees, who were not persons with an
interest substantially adverse to that of the settlor,47 from revesting in the
grantor title to the corpus or income of any of the trusts and that the possi-
bility of their doing so was sufficient to bring the trusts within sections 166
and 167. The taxpayer had claimed that any equity court in Illinois, under
whose laws the trusts had been created and were being administered, would,
if appealed to, prohibit such a revesting. Although the Commissioner agreed
that Illinois law controlled, he challenged the taxpayer's interpretation of that
law. Thus the federal income tax liability of the grantors under sections 166
and 167 turned on the interpretation of state law.4 8 Characterizing the power
of the trustees as absolute 49 rather than fiduciary, 0 the Tax Court held that
the trustees could revest title to the corpus in the grantor without interference
by an Illinois court of equity.5 ' The circuit court of appeals, however, was
"convinced that the wife and brother as trustees had no authority under the
Illinois law to revest the property in the grantor" and reversed the Tax
Court's holding on that point.5 2 The Supreme Court accepted the circuit
court's determination without further inquiry, saying: "This conclusion does
not spring from a statute of that state nor even from a clear and satisfying
line of decisions. It is, however, the reasoned judgment of the circuit which
includes Illinois in which a judge of long experience in the jurisprudence of
that state participated. Without a definite conviction of error, this Court will
not reverse that judgment." 53 The Stuart case, therefore, is apparently now
authority for the proposition that the Supreme Court will not reverse a cir-
upon the courts by Section 6(b) [Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 72] is fully per-
formed when they determine that there has been a fair hearing, with notice and an oppor-
tunty to present the circumstances and arguments to the decisive body, and an applica-
tion of this statute in a just and reasoned manner." Taxpayers are not likely to go
to the expense of securing such an appellate review.
45. See Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
46. In the Stuart case the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed as to Illinois law. The Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's determination,
even though "this conclusion [did] not spring from a statute of that state nor even from
a clear or satisfying line of decisions." 317 U. S. at 163.
47. Compare Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U. S. 706 (1941).
48. Federal tax incidence frequently depends on determinations of local law. See
PAUL, The Effect of Federal Taxation of Local Rulcs of Property in SELECED S'UDIES
IN FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND SERIES (1938) 1.
49. See Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
50. See Higgins v. White, 93 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937).
51. 42 B.-T. A. 1421 (1940).
52. 124 F. (2d) 722, 778 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
53. 317 U. S. 154, 163 (1942).
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cuit court's determination of local law which is silent or confused except upon
a showing of unreasonableness.
This new 5 rule, which contradicts earlier decisions .,5 and seems to extend a
principle of review built up under Eric Railroad v. Toinpkins,0 probably
reflects the desire of the Court to give circuit court decisions a finality which
will relieve the burden on the Supreme Court and leave the determinations
of questions of local law in the hands of those thought specially qualified
to handle them. But instead of lightening the burden on the Court, the
rule is more likely to result in extended argument as to whether or not there
is any rational basis for the circuit court's determination, and the time thus
consumed will probably be no more than would be required to hear the local
law question on its merits. Moreover, it would appear that this principle of
review will necessarily confuse the ultimate determination of federal tax liti-
gation and, in limiting the presumption formerly accorded the Commissioner's
determination of local law, undermine efficient tax administration.
THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE AND APPEAL IN
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS*
SINCE the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,1 a process of judi-
cial interpretation has limited the right of third parties in interest to intervene
before the Federal Communications Commission in hearings directed toward
the granting, refusing, or modification of a radio broadcasting license and the
complementary right to appeal from the decisions in such hearings. The prob-
lem of curtailing intervention and appeal is complicated by the fact that this
Commission, unlike other administrative bodies, operates within the narrow
confines of the wave lengths 2 and regulates interests which compete among
themselves for the limited frequency space available.
54. The Court, however, attempted to distinguish the rule applied in the Smart case
and that applied in Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 543 (1942); Helvering v. Fuller,
310 U. S.:69 (1940Y; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80 (1940): Helvering v. Fitch,
309 U. S. 149 (1940); In each of these cases the Supreme Court revierwed the merits of
a circuit court's: determination of local law.
- 55. See cases cited note 54 supra.
56. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 169 (1943) ; Eisenstein,
supra note.29, at.548, n. ?62.
*FCC v. NBC, 63 Sup. Ct. 1035 (U. S. 1943), aff'g, NBC v. FCC, 132 F. (2d) 545
(App. D. C. 1942).
1. 48 STAT. 1064 et seq. (1934), 47 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. (1940).
2. See NBC v. FCC, 132 F. (2d) 545, 548 (App. D. C. 1942) : "In the present stage
of radio, very few changes, either in frequency or in power, can be made without creating
some degree of electrical interference. This may range from minute and practically harm-
less interruption with remote and very occasional listeners in secondary service areas to
total obliteration in the primary field."
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The right of third parties to appeal has been controlled through a flexible
application of the general statutory prerequisite of some "public interest, con-
venience, or necessity." 3 In interpreting this requirement, the courts have set
up and attempted to reconcile the two divergent propositions that ". . . pri-
vate litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest" 4
and that appellants "to have standing in court, must show an injury or threat
to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest
in the administration of the law." 5 On the basis of these criteria, an appeal is
permitted under section 402(b) of the Communications Act 0 to persons
aggrieved if they combine allegations of substantial financial injury with a
claim that the public interest has been disregarded by the Commission. But
a mere allegation of injury through increased competition is insufficient be-
cause the appellant, although apparently having suffered severe financial loss,
does not speak as a representative of the public interest.7 The investment in
radio equipment made in reliance on a license may in some instances be a
ground for appeal because the licensee is protected by the Fifth Amendment
from capricious and arbitrary action on the part of the Commission., Yet a
3. 48 STAT. 1085 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §309(a) (1940). For a discussion of this
statutory criterion, see Penstone, Meaning of the Term "Public Interest, Convenience, or
Necessity" under the Communications Act of 1934, as Applied to Applications for Licenses
to Construct New Broadcasting Stations (1941) 9 GEO. WAsn. L. REv. 873. Mr. Penstone
interprets the phrase in terms of four basic elements: public need; legal, technical and
financial qualifications of the applicant; the absence of objectionable interference; merit
and suitability of the applicant's proposed programs to the needs of the community.
4. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 125 (1940).
5. Scripps-Howard v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 14 (1942). See Warner, Subjective Judi-
cial Review of the Federal Communications Commission (1940) 38 Mixci. L. REv. 632, 665
et seq. for a criticism of this type of standard.
6. 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 402(b) (1940) provides:
"An appeal may be taken, in the manner hereinafter provided, from decisions of the
Commission to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in any of the following
cases:
"(1) By an applicant for a construction permit for a radio station, or for a radio
station license, or for renewal of an existing station license, or for modification of an
existing radio station license, whose application is refused by the Commission,
"(2) By any other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by
any decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such application."
7. See Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F. (2d) 212 (App. D. C. 1939) 217, n. 14:
"It is . . . apparent that the granting of a license by the Commission creates a highly
valuable property right, which, while limited in character, nevertheless provides the basis
upon which large investments of capital are made . . . ." See Symons Broadcasting
Co. v. FRC, 64 F. (2d) 381, 382 (App. D. C. 1933); MoRRoW, SoME CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTS OF THE Co I uNIcAToNs ACT OF 1934 (1938) 39-48; 1 SOCOLOW, Tim LAW OF
RADIO BROADCASTING (1939) 1000, n. 13; Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity to be
Heard in the Administrative Process (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1093, 1118 et seq. (a criticism
of the view that licenses are "privileges" under the law rather than property rights and
so can be revoked without hearing) ; (1940) 11 AIR L. Rav. 177, 183.
8. See WOKO v. FCC, 109 F. (2d) 665 (App. D. C. 1939).
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licensee generally has no vested property interest in his license o and may not,
simply on the basis of past operation of a broadcasting station, acquire any
interest in the radio market and thereby protect himself from future competi-
tors.'0
Although there has been some confusion as to the right of appeal on the
basis of electrical interference without financial injury, it would appear that
the doctrines developed with regard to financial loss are equally applicable in
this case. 1 Despite the fact that electrical interference is almost always accom-
panied by financial injury, it is probable that in the case of non-profit and
clear-channel stations this financial loss would be too slight to be a suffi-
cient basis for appeal, and the only possible remedy to the courts would be on
a claim of substantial electrical interference. However, the unfortunate dictum
in the Sanders case that Congress "may have been of opinion that one likely
to be financially injured by the issue of a license would he the only person
having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court
errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the license" 12 once
9. See Scripps-Howard v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 14 (1942), where Mr. Justice Frank-
furter states: "The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights." Sce
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940), holding that no one
has "anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license."
Cf. FRC v. Nelson Bros., 289 U. S. 266 (1933) (temporary licenses granted by the Fed-
eral Radio Commission may be summarily revoked).
10. In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940) the Cturt
stated: "Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against competitio:n
but to protect the public. Congress intended to leave competition in the business of brad-
casting where it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with
other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs
attractive to the public." (Italics added). See also Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. FCC, 94
F. (2d) 249 (App. D. C. 1937). Cf. Piedmont Light & Power Co. Y. Town of Graham,
253 U. S. 193, 195 (1920) : "The grant . . . not being an exclusive one the contention
that competition in business, likely to result from a similar grant to another company,
would be . . . a taking of . . . property in violation of the Constitution is . . . plainly
frivolous." See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Edgerton in NBC v. FCC, 132 F.
(2d) 545, 575 (App. D. C. 1943).
11. Ward v. FCC, 108 F. (2d) 486. 487 (App. D. C. 1939) is specific: "The con-
siderations upon which we held in the Yankee Network case, that injury to economic
interests may be sufficient to bring a station licensee within the terms of Section 402(b) (2)
as an aggrieved person, are equally applicable in the case of objectionable electrical
interference." Similar holdings had been implied in Symons Broadcasting Co. v. FRC,
64 F. (2d) 381 (App. D. C. 1933) and in Journal Co. v. FRC, 48 F. (2d) 461 (App.
D. C 1931).
Nor has the FCC itself ignored electrical interference as a basis for refusing a
license modification. See 'Matter of North Carolina Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C. Rep. 2S2
(1935) ; Matter of Peoria Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C. Rep. 167 (1935).
12. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477 (1940). 11 Am L. RL--.
177. The effect of the dictum in the Sanders case was made especially strong in that the
Supreme Court amended its opinion after handing it down by ordering the insertion of
the word "financial." See 309 U. S. 642 (1940).
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indicated that the United States Supreme Court might exclude those injured
only electrically from judicial review of the Commission's determinations.
While there has been little explicit judicial discussion of the right to inter-
vene, it would seem that in general third parties are permitted to intervene in
Commission hearings where a substantive right of the would-be intervenor
is in question. Because judicial review is limited to an examination of ques-
tions of law, the courts have often considered it an inadequate substitute for
an administrative hearing.' 3 In Chicago Federation of Labor v. FRC,
14 it
was held that where new broadcasting station licenses were to be considered,
existing licensees, if they were to be substantially affected, should be allowed
to intervene in the proceedings. In Saltzman v. Strombcrg-Carlson Telephone
Manufacturing Company,15 the Commission was enjoined from issuing with-
out notice or hearing to the applicant a renewal license for a frequency other
than that for which the broadcasting station had originally applied. Although
in this case there was no attempt to intervene by a third party, the situation
is similar to that in which a third party who has made no request to the Com-
mission finds his license indirectly modified by a Commission order. The rule
of these cases was apparently extended in Symons Broadcasting Company v.
FRC,16 where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held it the
duty of the Commission to grant either of two applicants for the same fre-
quency a hearing if desired. A possible stringent limitation upon the freedom
of intervention was indicated, however, in Sykes v. Jenny Wren. 7 There a
third party sought to intervene because the quality of service offered the public
would be impaired and increased competition would result from a Commission
authorization of longer hours of a competitor's operation, and it was held that
13. A debate has long raged whether the courts' power to review questions of law
and also to remand a case to the Commission if there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port the Commission's decision is a sufficient substitute for an administrative hearing.
The leading case supporting the contention that judicial review per se is an adequate
protection is 'Sykes v. Jenny Wren, 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D. C. 1935). The dissenting
opinion of Judge Groner, however, was especially strong; and in NBC v. FCC, 132 F.
(2d) 545 (App. D. C. 1942) it apparently became the view of the court. But cf. Symons
Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 64 F. (2d) 381 (App. D. C. 1933), where the court remanded
the case because "there is nothing in the record . . . by which we are able to determine
the rights of the parties on the merits"; Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.
(2d) 282 (App. D. C. 1938), where an applicant was denied *judicial relief because it had
not yet exhausted the administrative remedies. See Davis, supra note 7, at 1139:' "Even
though due process may be satisfied by judicial review, it does not follow that judicial
review is an adequate substitute for administrative hearings . . . . For protection of
private parties, a regularized administrative procedure may afford far better safeguards
than a theoretical right of review, which is so illusory."
14. 41 F. (2d) 422, 423 (App. D. C. 1930).
15. 46 F. (2d) 612 (App. D. C. 1931). Notice the restricted concept that "... a
hearing implies that an opportunity will be given the applicant to appear and hear the
evidence and examine and cross-examine the witnesses, to test, explain and refute any
evidence introduced against him."
16. 64 F. (2d) 381, 382 (App. D. C. 1933).
17. 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D. C. 1935). See note 13 supra.
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the right of the aggrieved party to judicial review was a satisfactory substi-
tute for intervention.
The rights of intervention and appeal have been substantially extended by
a recent case.' The Matheson Radio Company, operating Station WHDH at
Boston, Massachusetts, applied for and received an order authorizing increased
hours of operation and increased power. Station KOA of Denver, Colorado,
claiming that this order effectively modified its own license and deprived it
of the clear channel established under the North American Regional Broad-
casting Agreement,'9 filed petitions to intervene both before and after the
proposed findings of fact were issued by the Commission.20 Both petitions
were denied, but KOA was permitted to file a brief amicus curiae. KOA
thereupon appealed under section 402(b) as an aggrieved party, claiming no
financial injury but merely electrical interference.
Agreeing in substance with the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia,21 a majority of the United States Supreme Court felt that an allegation
of substantial electrical interference was sufficient to permit an appeal by Sta-
tion KOA _2 and, by implication, denied that FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station had limited the right of standing to appeal to financial injury alone.
XWithout attempting to distinguish the dictum in the Sanders case, Mr. Justice
Roberts apparently wished those injured electrically to have no more and no
fewer rights than those injured financially.
Through a novel construction of the Communications Act of 1934, the ma-
jority opinion interpreted section 312(b),2 3 which prescribes the procedure
18. FCC v. NBC, 63 Sup. Ct 1035 (U. S. 1943), aff'g, NBC v. FCC, 132 F. (2d)
545 (App. D. C. 1942).
19. 55 STAT. 1005 (1941). For a discussion of the KOA case and of clear channels,
see Hearings before the Committce on Interstate and Foreign Con:merce on Proposed
Changes i; the Commniications Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1941) 422-24, 692-93,
1040; DILL. RA~io LAW (1938) 108 et seq.
20. See Brief for Appellant, app., NBC v. FCC, 132 F. (2d) 545 (App. D. C. 1942)
for a collection of the various documents in this case.
2f. NBC v. FCC, 132 F. (2d) 545 (App. D. C. 1942), (1943) 31 GEo. L. J. 80.
22. See the dissenting opinion which agrees that if a person financially injured has
standing to appeal, "so does one whose station will suffer from electrical interference,"
but does not believe that KOA has sustained or is about to sustain any substantial elez-
trical injury. 63 Sup. Ct. at 1047. Moreover, "if we accept as constitutionally valid a
system of judicial review invoked by a private person who has no individual substantive
right to protect but who has standing only as a representative of the public interest, then
I think we must be exceedingly scrupulous to see to it that his interest in the matter is
substantial and immediate." Id. at 1046.
23. 48 STAT. 1087 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §312(b) (1940) provides: "Any station
license . . .granted under the provisions of this chapter or the construction permit re-
quired hereby and hereinafter issued may be modified by the Cummission either for a
limited time or for the duration of the term thereof, if in the judgment of the CommiF6i'n
such actions will promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity, or the provisions of
this chapter or any treaty ratified by the United States will be more fully complied with:
Provided, however, That no such order of modification shall become final until the hold-
ers of such outstanding license or permit shall have been notified in writing of the pro-
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for Commission modifications of radio licenses, as allowing the intervention
of all third parties substantially affected. Without generalizing on the legality
of the Commission's new rules on intervention, the Court held that under this
section the Commission was obliged on the request of KOA, to make that
station a party to the proceedings modifying the license of WHDH. The con-
tention that the position of KOA as amicus curiae was a satisfactory sub-
stitute for its being made a party was not discussed. Thus the Court
adopted the view, vaguely expressed in earlier cases, that this provision of
the statute refers not only to direct modifications of licenses but also to con-
structive modifications which are brought about by means of a change in
power, hours, or frequency of another licensee. It is difficult to determine
whether the Court accorded a similar multi-party construction to section
303(f), which provides that modifications "shall not be made without the
consent of the station licensee." 24 Mr. Justice Roberts mentioned the con-
tention of NBC that this provision of the law also applied to constructive modi-
fications, but did not specifically rule on it. 25 However, section 309(a), 2" which
posed action and the grounds or reasons therefor and shall have been given reasonable
opportunity to show cause why such an order of modification should not issue."
But see the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter which, in speaking of. section 312(b),
states: "I cannot read the requirement for 'reasonable opportunity to show cause why
such an order of modification shall not issue' as a denial to the Commission of power to
make such a reasonable rule for sifting the responsibility of potential intervenors," 63
Sup. Ct. at 1046.
24. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §303(f) (1940). This section gives the Com-
mission power to "make such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem neces-
sary to prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions of this
chapter: Provided, however, That changes in the frequencies, authorized power, or in
the times of operation of any station, shall not be made without the consent of the station
licensee unless, after a public hearing, the Commission shall determine that such changes
will promote public convenience or interest or will serve public necessity, or the provisions
of this chapter will be more fully complied with."
25. But see headnote to the case of FCC v. NBC in 11 U. S. L. WEEK 4379 (U. S.
1943) which interprets the decision as allowing intervention under 303(f) and does not
mention 312(b).
26. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 309(a) (1940) provides: "If upon exam-
ination of any application for a station license or for the renewal or modification of a
station license the Commission shall determine that the public interest, convenience, or
necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall authorize the issuance, removal
or modification thereof in accordance with said finding. In the event the Commission upon
examination of any such application does not reach such decision with respect thereto,
it shall notify the applicant thereof, shall fix and give notice of a time and place for
hearing thereon, and shall afford such applicant an opportunity to be heard under such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe."
There is some evidence that a revision of section 309 was contemplated at one time.
See Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10348,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 38, where Mr. Herbert Bingham, appearing on behalf of the
Federal Communications Bar Association, said that "in all such cases we believe that due
process as well as common justice requires that the right to participate be extended to




stipulates when a hearing must be held on an application for modification of a
license, was said not to include third party licensees affected by the proposed
change.
In a dissenting opinion concurred in by 'Mr. Justice Douglas, 'Mr. Justice
Frankfurter dealt at length with the problem of intervention and the Commis-
sion's new rules and regulations concerning it. Pleading for flexibility in mat-
ters of administrative procedure,2 - he maintained that the majority's construe-
tion of 312(b) was contrary to Congressional intent and that the lower court's
decision on section 1.102 28 of the Commission's rules and regulations
too severely limited the Commission. This section, which had been construed
to recognize no statutory right to intervene in Maiter of HazehLood,20 was
held by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to be a violation
of the Communications Act. In the Hazlcw,ood proceeding, the Commission-
ers declared that the Commission could place on the petitioner the burden of
proving his status as a representative of the public interest, and stated that a
former rule, under which merely a disclosure of a substantial interest was
sufficient for intervention, "was so broad and the Commission's practice under
it so loose that intervention in Commission hearings came to be almost a
matter lying in the exclusive discretion of persons seeking to become parties
27. 63 Sup. Ct. 1035, 1046 (U. S. 1943). He states: "To deny to tile Commission
the right to require a preliminary showing, such as was found wanting here, before ad-
mitting a petitioner to the full rights of a party litigant is to fasten upon the Commis-
sion's administrative process the technical requirements evolved by courts for the adjudi-
cation of controversies over private interests . . . . It is to assume that the modes fa-
miliar to courts for the protection of substantial interests are the only permissible modes
regardless of the nature of the subject matter and the tribunals charged with the admin-
istration of the law."
MAfr. Justice Frankfurter also quotes his words in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940) that "necessarily . . . the subordinate questions of procedure in
ascertaining the public interest, when the Commission's licensing authority is invoked-
the scope of the inquiry, whether applications should be heard contemporaneously or
successively, whether parties should be allowed to intervene in one another's proceed-
ings, and similar questions-were explicitly and by implication left to the Commission's
own devising, so long, of course, as it observes the basic requirements designed for the
protection of private as well as public interest"
See Ward v. FCC, 108 F. (2d) 486, 491 (App. D. C. 1939); SE..,. Doc. No. 185,
77th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 16-21 (especially the frank discussk'n of the dilatory tactics
which grew up through the easy rules regarding interventions); Hcarin,3s before /le
Committee on Interstate and Foreion Commerce on H. R. 10348, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938), 782-92 (a vigorous defense by Commissioner Fly in behalf of liberal rules of
intervention).
28. This section provides: "Petitions for intervention must set forth the grounds of
the proposed intervention, the position and interest of the petitioner in the proceeding,
the facts on which the petitioner bases his claim that his intervention will be in the pub-
lic interest . . . . The granting of a petition to intervene shall have the effect of per-
mitting intervention before the Commission but shall not be considered as any recognition
of any legal or equitable right or interest in the proceeding . .. ."
29. 7 F.C.C. Rep. 443 (1939). See (1940) 11 Am L. Rv. 73, 82 for a criticism of this
Commission decision.
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to Commission proceedings." 30 Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed with the Com-
missioners and emphasized the broad rule-making powers granted the Com-
mission by Congress.3 '
Although the decision of the majority granting an appeal on the ground of
electrical interference without financial injury constitutes an approval of a
doctrine long recognized by the lower courts, its interpretation of the Com-
munications Act with regard to intervention had apparently never before been
suggested.3 2 If appeals were limited, the liberal rule of intervention prescribed
by the Court would, of course, be desirable. But except in the rare case, an
appeal may be had in any proceeding in which intervention is now permit-
ted.3 3 And since appellate courts have the power to review errors of law and
the far broader power to remand when there is no substantial evidence on
which to base the administrative decision, an appeal affords adequate protec-
tion to the rights of both applicants and third parties.2 4 In view of the infor-
30. 7 F.C.C. Rep. 443, 444 (1939).
31. 48 STAT. 1068 (1934). 47 U. S. C. § 154(j) (1940) provides that "the Commis-
sion may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dis-
patch of business and to the ends of justice .... "
32. Brief for Appellant, pp. 24 et seq., NBC v. FCC, 132 F. (2d) 545 (App. D. C.
1942) did suggest that section 303(f), because of the use of the phrase "change i fre-
quencies" rather than "change of frequencies" meant that it was applicable to third-party
stations. But Judge Rutledge in the court of appeals rested his construction of sec-
tion 303(f) on broader grounds than these "prepositional hairsplittings," and the Supreme
Court did not even consider the contention. The briefs did not, however, even suggest
that section 312(b) might be similarly construed.
See 72 CONG. REC. 8052 (1930), where a "modification" is spoken of only in terms
of the station whose license is actually altered; 1 SOCOLOW, op. cit. sn pra note 7, at 67,
100-03 for a similar interpretation of section 303(f).
33. The rare exceptions are those clear-channel cases where, because the stations
may be many hundreds of miles from one another, any financial injury will not be sub-
stantial and also cases of non-profit broadcasting stations. See NBC v. FCC, 132 F.
(2d) 545, 548-49 (App. D. C. 1942).
34. But cf. Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 934, 936: "And while a broadcaster whose
license is about to be revoked or altered, or whose effective service area is to be curtailed
by the granting of permission to another station to operate on the same wave length, is
constitutionally entitled to be heard in opposition to such action, it does not necessarily
follow that a broadcaster whose privilege may become less valuable because of the in-
creased competition of a new station seeking a permit, or of a competitor seeking an
extended time allotment, has the same right."
Yet the courts evidently want an objector to be heard during some stage of the pro-
ceedings. Only on such a basis can explanation be made for the dictum of FCC v. San-
ders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 476 (1940) that "it does not follow that, because
the licensee of a station cannot resist the grant of a license to another, on the ground
that the resulting competition may work economic injury to him, he has no standing to
appeal from an order of the Commission granting the application." But cf. the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 20-21
(1942).
See, as to the requirement of due process, Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 18
et seq. (1938) ; Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 480 (1936) ; Saginaw Broadcast-
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mality and flexibility sought to be achieved through the administrative com-
mission 35 the Court's interpretation of the Act would, therefore, appear to
be an unfortunate one; for to grant the Commission no discretion in the mat-
ter of who may be parties in its hearings is to formalize it and overburden it
by subjecting it to the dilatory tactics of third-party licensees.
ing Co. v. FCC, 96 F. (2d) 554 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Symons Broadcasting Co. v. FRC,
64 F. (2d) 331 (App. D. C. 1933).
35. See Davis, supra note 7. The whole article is a study of non-formalistic substi-
tutes which would satisfy the requirements of opportunity to be heard and due process in
an administrative hearing and yet allow for an easy and adequate procedure. See also
the examination and criticisms of the procedure of the Federal Communications Com-
mission in SEN. Doc. No. 186, 77th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 8-42.
